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ABSTRACT
ROUSSEAU’S GENERAL WILL IN THE LIGHT OF BERLIN
Necip Yıldız
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor:  Dr. Simon Wigley
September 2001
This thesis aims to investigate Rousseau’s General Will in the light of Isaiah Berlin’s
views on negative freedom, positive freedom, political monism and political
pluralism. It is argued that, along with the romanticist readings of the General Will
which rely on compassion to explain the General Will, a rationalist reading of the
General Will, as exampled by Isaiah Berlin, is also a possibility. According to that
reading, the General Will is associated with positive freedom (i.e. rational
autonomy) and therefore taken as a rationalist project.
The singularity (or monism) of the General Will is criticized in the thesis since it
might possibly lead to authoritarianism. However it is also argued that pluralism, as
exampled by Berlin, might also turn out to be authoritarian if it seeks to ground
itself upon an objective reality. This leaves us at an impasse with regard to the
Rousseauian legacy, for it might leave us with no basis from which to challenge it.
Keywords: Rousseau, General Will, Negative Freedom, Positive Freedom,
Romanticism, Rationalism, Political Monism, Political Pluralism.
iv
ÖZET
ISAİAH BERLİN’İN GÖRÜŞLERİ IŞIĞINDA ROUSSEAU’NUN GENEL İRADE
KAVRAMI
Necip Yıldız
Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez yöneticisi: Dr. Simon Wigley
Eylül, 2001
Bu tezde, Rousseau’nun Genel İrade kavramı Isaiah Berlin’in görüşleri ışığında ele
alınmıştır. Berlin’in ‘negatif özgürlük’, ‘pozitif özgürlük’, ‘siyasal tekçilik’ ve
‘siyasal çoğulculuk’ hakkındaki görüşleri Genel İrade kavramına uygulanmış ve bu
kavramın ‘pozitif özgürlük’ arayışı çerçevesinde değerlendirilebileceği sonucuna
varılmıştır.
Tezde, Genel İrade kavramını, toplumcu şefkat görüşüyle açıklamaya çalışan
romantik okuma biçimi genel çerçevesiyle verilmiş, fakat Berlin’in önerdiği
rasyonalist okuma biçimi öne çıkarılmıştır.
Tezde, Genel İrade kavramının dayandığı tekçilik, otoriterliğe kapı açabilecek bir
olasılık olarak sunulmakla birlikte, Berlin gibi modernist liberallerin çoğulculuğu
mutlaklaştırmalarının ve herkese dayatmalarının da aynı şekilde otoriterlik olarak
sunulabileceği savunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda Michael Kenny ve Richard Rorty’nin
Berlin’e yönelttiği eleştirilere yer verilmiş, ve böylelikle Berlin’in Rousseau’yu
okuma biçimi eleştirel bir açıdan değerlendirilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rousseau, Genel İrade, Negatif Özgürlük, Pozitif Özgürlük,
Romantizm, Rasyonalizm, Siyasal Tekçilik, Siyasal Çoğulculuk.
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1INTRODUCTION
The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate Rousseau’s conception of General
Will and give a general account of the romanticist and especially the rationalist readings
of this conception. It is correct to say that, in the history of ideas, Rousseau’s conception
of General Will has been interpreted and ‘used’ both in romanticist and rationalist ways.
Notwithstanding the enduring effects of the romanticist reading within the history of
ideas, I aim in this dissertation to give specific emphasis to the rationalist reading of
Rousseau’s General Will. On that basis, we can associate Rousseau’s General Will with
what Berlin characterizes as positive freedom.
It seems that the analytical distinction between “compassion” and “reason” makes the
two readings irreconcilable: Whereas the romanticist reading explains the General Will
on the basis of “compassion”, the rationalist reading explains the General Will on the
basis of “reason”. Since compassion and reason are totally different faculties, one should
provide good reasons for reading Rousseau’s General Will either as a romanticist or a
rationalist project. We should acknowledge that none of the commentators of Rousseau
have had any doubt about the fact, particularly in the Discourse on Inequality and
Discourse on Political Economy, that Rousseau has a romanticist dimension. Throughout
these books, Rousseau gives an anthropological account of the inequality in the society,
and argues for the necessity of simplicity and equality among men. Rousseau says in the
Discourse on Political Economy that we should have a homeland which is unanimously
loved by its people, and which rests on the “protection of the least of its members”
(Discourse on Political Economy in Rousseau’s Political Writings, p. 70). Rousseau
2seems to justify his egalitarianism in Discourse on Inequality and Discourse on Political
Economy on the basis of one’s pity for others. Egalitarianism in these two books is
presented as constitutive of social justice, and thus presented as the core of the public
morality. Throughout these two books, we see Rousseau as a romantic republican, and
there is hardly any argument there, which relies on reason or rational reflection. In the On
Social Contract however, which is Rousseau’s most recent and mature work, he presents
a quite different element into his system, namely rational self-control, which he
formulates as “consulting one’s reason before listening to his inclinations” (On Social
Contract in Rousseau’s Political Writings, p.95). Those who tend to read Rousseau’s On
Social Contract with Discourse on Inequality and Discourse on Political Economy in
mind, assume that the General Will rests necessarily on the mutual and generalized
‘compassion’ that the citizens feel for each other. (Judith Skhlar and Hannah Arendt carry
out such a romanticist reading as I will show in Chapter 1). However one can also find
good evidence throughout On Social Contract that the supposed General Will rests on a
different human faculty, namely rational self-legislation. In On Social Contract,
Rousseau no longer relies on feelings (like compassion) to justify his idea of a common
good and General Will, but relies on what he formulates as man’s ‘moral liberty’ which
he says “makes man truly his own master [since] impulsion by appetite alone is slavery,
and obedience to the law that one has prescribed for oneself is liberty” (On Social
Contract in Rousseau’s Political Writings, p.96).
We could safely argue that there is some divergence between Rousseau’s earlier work
and his later recent work, On Social Contract. In the earlier books, Rousseau relies on
3compassion as the basis of a homeland, whereas in On Social Contract he relies on
rational self-reflection of the citizens as the basis of the country’s self-government. Since
there is no theoretical mid-point between compassion (which is spontaneous) and reason
(which is reflective), it is not possible in any way to fill the gap between Rousseau’s
earlier political writings and his On Social Contract. My interpretation of this
irreconciliability is that Rousseau might have thought that since man’s uncorrupt feelings
(that are best seen in the savage man and his way of simple living) have already passed
away long ago in history, and since we are now living in a highly sophisticated society,
the realistic solution for today’s society should exclusively rely on, not spontaneous
feelings, but on rational self-reflection. We should admit that Kant took such a position in
his political writings and said that while we could possibly rely on the feelings of the
savage man in the past, we are now in an age of reason and civilization, and thus we
should somehow rely on a rational morality which, he says, we are still far short of. (See
Kant’s Political Writings, p. 49).
It could be argued that while Discourse on Inequality and Discourse on Political
Economy reflect Rousseau’s longing for a rustic simplicity and equality merely at a
romantic level and on the basis of mutual feelings, On Social Contract seems to rely on a
more reflective and calculative language. Rousseau might have implied by this shift that
man might gain through rational self-reflection (i.e. social contract) what he has lost by
losing his natural and spontaneous feelings by the advent of the idea of living in a
‘society’. That is to say, he might have thought of rational self-reflection as the only
possible solution after the fact that man has lost his natural innocence by living in a
4society, and thus he should not rely on his feelings or instincts (as did the uncorrupted
savage man), but on his reason. Rousseau’s conception of ‘moral liberty’ is thus the
negation of instincts and the affirmation of reason, which he reflects in his On Social
Contract as the basis of a country’s just laws.
While authors like Judith Skhlar and Hannah Arendt read Rousseau’s General Will in a
romanticist way, authors like Isaiah Berlin and Margaret Canovan interpret Rousseau’s
General Will as a rationalist project. Throughout the thesis, I am going to focus on the
rationalist reading in order to show that Rousseau’s conception of General Will might
also be read as a rationalist project. We should say that Berlin's and Canovan’s criticisms
towards Rousseau basically converge around the idea that the General Will is singular
and thus it precludes a pluralist society (We should admit that, either we read Rousseau’s
General Will in a romanticist way or a rationalist way, it is still singular and therefore
against pluralism). Throughout the thesis, I am going to explain the possible monistic
dimensions inherent in Rousseau’s General Will with reference to Berlin’s conception of
‘positive freedom’ and with reference to his epistemological explanations on political
monism and political pluralism.
Supposing that Berlin is right in calling Rousseau as a monist, I believe that the question
as to why Berlin’s own attitude (i.e. pluralism) should be taken as better than Rousseau’s,
needs to be asked. The possible connotations of Berlin’s claim to objectivity, that
5pluralism and negative freedom are inherently the good form of life for people1 is
criticized by authors like Michael Kenny and Richard Rorty on the basis that Berlin
himself also turns out to be authoritarian in as much as he forces people into what he
takes as the good form of life (i.e. pluralism). Throughout the thesis (in Chapter 3), I am
going to give a general account of these criticisms towards Berlin to further our ideas on
whether Rousseau’s General Will is criticized on sound grounds or not, and whether we
could take liberalism and pluralism as inherently good projects vis-a-vis non-liberal ones,
or not.
The structure of my thesis will be such that in Chapter 1, I give a general impression of
Rousseau’s General Will and investigate the theoretical implications of the inalienable,
indestructible and indivisible general will. Throughout the chapter, the possible
romanticist and rationalist readings of this concept will be mentioned and put into
context.
In Chapter 2, I give an account of negative freedom and positive freedom with reference
to Isaiah Berlin, and argue that we can associate Rousseau’s General Will with what
Berlin calls as positive freedom (i.e. rational autonomy). Such a reading of the General
Will would suggest that Rousseau’s General Will is a ‘rationalist’ project. So Chapter 2
gives the background of a rationalist reading of Rousseau’s General Will. Throughout
Chapter 2, I will give a long account of political monism (singularism) and political
pluralism (political diversity) with reference to Berlin’s epistemological characterization
                                                
1 Although Berlin views negative freedom as merely a procedural issue, we cannot deny that negative
freedom itself also reflects a certain world view on the good form of life. This point will be mentioned later
6of the two traditions. I am going to argue that Rousseau’s General Will fits Berlin’s
characterization of monism, and in this regard might be taken as a project whose
singularism might lead to authoritarian results.
Chapter 3 is a critique of Berlin by thinkers like Michael Kenny and Richard Rorty. In
other words, a challenge to Berlin's critique of Rousseau's General Will legacy. In this
chapter, I am going to give a general account of the criticisms towards Berlin, which
argue that Berlin’s defense of pluralism seems to situate itself as a supra-historical reality,
as if it was a transcendental truth. In order to illustrate the point, I will discuss Rorty’s
criticism of the modernist liberals’, and Rorty’s own ideas on historical contingency, to
give a critical sense of the cleavage between political monism (as characterized through
Rousseau’s General Will) and political pluralism (as characterized through Berlin’s
characterization of negative freedom).
                                                                                                                                                
in the context of critics towards Berlin.
7CHAPTER I
ROUSSEAU’S CONCEPTION OF GENERAL WILL AND POSSIBLE
READINGS OF IT
In this chapter, I aim to give a general impression of Rousseau’s conception of General
Will with textual support, and the possible ways to read it with reference to Rousseau
written work. There is no doubt that Rousseau’s articulation of the General Will as the
basis of a society’s self-government has been influential on democratic theory. Although
some authors argue that his conception of the social contract and General Will lack a
participatory character, we still cannot deny that his democratic ideas have been
extensively used and have been inspirational for many projects of self-government.
1.1. A General Impression of Rousseau’s General Will
Rousseau’s problematization of the one and the many in political discussions is
interesting in terms of his theory of democracy. We actually have enough evidence that
he views society as an entity which has a self and a will. (See Discourse on Inequality,
p.61 and On Social Contract, p. 93). This conception of a society with a self and a will
might imply that Rousseau’s level of analysis which he applies to the society converges
towards the idea of a single solitary individual. Some authors have argued that reflecting
upon society as if it was a single individual with a single will might cause serious
problems in the sense that the many might be collapsed into one  (See Arendt’s On
Revolution, p.74). Whether Rousseau aimed for such a thing is another question, but
since there is textual evidence to interpret Rousseau’s General Will as a singular project,
it could be interesting to investigate how Rousseau handles the question of one and the
many in political life.
8Since the central aim of this chapter is to explain Rousseau’s conception of General Will,
I am going to refer to the texts where he elaborates on this concept. Although Rousseau
first explores the concept of General Will in his Discourse on Political Economy, we
should admit that he gives a more detailed account of it through his On Social Contract.
The question as to how we can define the General Will is a difficult question, even for
Rousseau we should admit; however Rousseau seems to give a functional, if not a
conceptual, definition of the General Will in Discourse on Political Economy on page 61
where he talks about the General Will for the first time. On this page, just after saying
that a society has a self common to the whole with its own integrity, Rousseau reflects
upon the General Will as such, which is the most explicit and integrated expression of the
General Will:
The body politic is, therefore also a moral being which has a will and
this general will, which always tends towards the conservation and
welfare of the whole and of each part, and which is the source of the
laws, is, for all the members of the state, in their relations to one
another and to the state, the rule of what is just and unjust. (On
Political Economy, p.61).
There is good evidence, not only in Discourse on Political Economy but also On Social
Contract, that Rousseau equates the General Will with ‘justice’ and ‘welfare of the
whole’ (public utility). For Rousseau, the General Will is the integrated will of the
society towards the good and the just. It is argued by Rousseau that once one becomes
part of the General Will, that person automatically becomes part of an indivisible civic
identity. Rousseau argues that while the single individuals give up their natural liberties
in the name of forming a state, they gain civil liberties which makes them equal citizens
9with equal and undifferentiating rights (On Social Contract, p.92). Rousseau argues that
such a social contract which makes men equal citizens does not take away from the
individuals their individual freedoms, but makes them equally free under a civic
equivalence. As an expression that could give some clues about Rousseau’s views on the
political problem of one and the many, he depicts the civic equivalence as such:
Finally each person in giving himself to all, gives himself to no one,
and as there are no associates over whom he does not acquire the
same right as he concedes to them over himself, he gains the
equivalent of all that he loses and more force to preserve what he
has.
1.2. The idea of an inalienable, indestructible and  indivisible General Will
Rousseau says that the General Will is inalienable, indestructible, indivisible and that it
cannot err in any way. Rousseau says the sovereignty is inalienable and cannot be
transferred, since it is the ‘will’ of a specific people, which is exclusively peculiar to that
society and therefore inalienable (See Book II, Chapter 1 in On Social Contract).
Rousseau says the sovereignty is also indivisible, since it is a singular will. Rousseau
states that dividing sovereignty into parts such as executive or legislative is not to divide
the sovereignty in principle but merely in its practical purposes. He says, despite the
differentiations in the state's functions, the will lying behind the differentiated functions
is in fact always the single General Will without being ever divided.
Rousseau says the General Will is indestructible and can never err unless it is deceived.
He says the General Will would always tend toward the public utility:
The general will is always in the right and always tends toward the
public utility, but it does not follow that the decisions of the people are
always equally correct. A person always wills his own good, but he
10
does not always see it; the people is never corrupted, but often
deceived, and it is only then that it appears to will what is bad.
Here it is implied that the society has an objective and constant  general will which is out
there and which exists even if the society might somehow be ignorant of it. This implies
that Rousseau’s General Will relies on an objectivist claim about the society’s common
good, in the sense that he envisages the society as having an objective public utilty,
independent of how the society actually views itself. This claim to objectivity will be
criticized in the later sections.
Rousseau says, as long as the private interests in a society do not take precedence over
the public good, the General Will would always prevail and there would be no partiality
that would harm the General Will (See On Social Contract, Book II, Chapter 3 ). It seems
from all these features that, the General Will is reflected by Rousseau as an urge towards
a singular ethical community.
Although we could admit that people gain a civic identity by adhering to a civic totality,
the point as to how one does not lose any freedom in that case is conceptually criticized
by authors like Benjamin Constant (See Constant’s views on Rousseau in a supplemented
part within Rousseau’s Political Writings, p. 213-215). Rousseau actually does not
explicitly say that one does not lose freedom by becoming a citizen but that he loses his
natural liberties in the name of gaining the civil liberties. It is a fact that Rousseau
associates the civil liberties with a philosophical and moral meaning and attaches to them
the term ‘moral liberty’ which you would gain by becoming self-legislating citizens. The
11
issue of ‘moral liberty’ will be explained in much detail in positive freedom section in
Chapter 2).
We could say that Rousseau’s General Will is foremost a theory of legitimate
government. All Rousseau does in his political writings is to investigate the necessary
conditions of the just and legitimate government. Rousseau says that a legitimate social
order should necessarily bind upon consent and agreement (On Social Contract, p. 85).
Rousseau says the legitimacy of a social order might only be possible through a social
contract to which all the members of the society become equal partners. This social pact
becomes possible, says Rousseau, by the “total alienation of each associate with all his
rights to the whole community” (On Social Contract, p. 92).
1.3. ‘Will of all’ versus the ‘General Will’
Since the General Will is depicted by Rousseau as the will of the society that tends
towards the just laws, it becomes crucial to differentiate what is just and unjust for
Rousseau. In this regard, Rousseau’s distinction between the partiality and the generality
reflect many of the subtleties within the conception of General Will. Rousseau's value
hierarchy, which is based on the acceptable and unacceptable forms of social and political
life, relies on his distinction between the partiality and generality, where the partiality is
associated with what is private and therefore against public morality, and the generality is
associated withpublic utility and thus justice. Rousseau argues that public utility (general
will) should always prevail over the private interests (particular wills). This means
nothing else than that Rousseau is foremost a ‘populist’ who associates the General Will
12
with the public utility. Rousseau’s antipathy with what he calls the ‘will of all’ is because
Rousseau sees it against the public utility. He says that the partial groups, pacts,
associations do not aim towards the public good but they form tacit organizations to gain
private benefits at the expense of the more general popular benefits (See how the ‘will of
all’ is contrasted with the ‘general will’ in On Social Contract, p. 101). It is clear that
Rousseau is against all sorts of partial organizations that might be against the public
good.
Rousseau depicts the public utility, especially in the Discourse on Political Economy as a
strict socio-economic egalitarianism. In this regard, liberal interest-seeking through
factions and interest groups (i.e. will of all) is taken by Rousseau as socially unacceptable
since it is assumed by him to be against the public utility.  Rousseau assumes that if the
partial groups would intervene into the public discussions, the strong and the rich would
somehow repress the poor and thus the general will (i.e. general welfare) would be
destroyed. Rousseau’s doubt against the inequalities within societies makes him negative
towards discussions in the society among partial groups. Such a reflected restriction on
partial associations is taken by most of the liberal thinkers as being against individual
liberties, however it seems that, for Rousseau, egalitarianism is the pre-requisite of the
healthy life of the civil body, and thus it is politically and morally constitutive.
It seems that Rousseau does not envisage any tragedy between partial interests and the
public interests, but straightforwardly gives priority to the public utility and drops the
possibility of forming partial associations. This might be normal in the sense that
13
Rousseau sees luxury, sophistication and diversification as corruptness, and therefore he
does not reflect upon the partial associations within the language of rights and negative
liberties but as a moral problem (In this regard, please see the relevance of Rousseau’s
General Will with what Berlin calls as positive freedom which I am going to elaborate in
Chapter 2).
1.4. Rousseau’s characterization of partiality versus generality
Rousseau’s reflection upon partiality and generality is actually very central to Rousseau’s
political system. We could say that this distinction emanates from a system of hierarchies
in Rousseau’s mind. Rousseau says that one is part of many inclusions at the same time.
One is part of a family, tribe, church, country and humanity at the same time. Rousseau
says however that these attachments should not have the equal status on the hierarchy.
Rousseau explains it as such:
A certain person might be a devout priest, or a brave soldier, or a
zealous professional, and yet a bad citizen; a certain decision
may be advantageous to the small communities and very
pernicious to the great one. It is true that since particular
societies are always subordinate to those which contain them, the
latter ought to be obeyed rather than the former, and the duties of
the citizen take precedence over those of the senator, and those of
the man over those of the citizen, but unfortunately personal
interest is always found in an inverse ratio to duty, and it
increases in proportion as the association becomes narrower and
the commitment less sacred. This is invincible proof that the
most general will is always the most just, and that the voice of
the people is the voice of God. (Discourse on Political Economy,
p.62).
The above quotation is a systematic expression of the fact that for Rousseau the more
general the will, the more just it is. Such a moral hierarchy actually which ends up by
14
God, tells us as to why partiality is always to be subordinated to a more general will
according to Rousseau. We could argue one step further that Rousseau’s egalitarianism
and populism finds its roots in such a metaphysical (or cosmic) hierarchy of values, that
the more general is the more just. The point as to why an included element of a set should
necessarily be bounded by a higher will is vague, but that is how Rousseau developed his
moral and political theory. Besides the generality issue, the issue of why equality is good
is taken for granted by Rousseau. Rousseau believes that equality is good and morally
binding, and once he puts it so, he uses it in all his arguments taken for granted. We could
say that the issue of equality (or egalitarianism) is the basis of all Rousseau’s social and
political system. He binds his public morality on egalitarianism. He says that this is the
pre-requisite of the civic equality, in the sense that only if there is perfect socio-economic
equality then the citizens might be autonomous and thus nobody could buy off the others
( Discourse on Political Economy, p. 72). Rousseau justifies in Discourse on Political
Economy his strict egalitarianism by  arguments such as “protecting the poor against the
tyranny of the rich.”. Relying on this side of Rousseau, many authors, especially from
left, have  inferred egalitarian arguments out of Rousseau.
Rousseau’s urge for egalitarianism through the General Will (which aims at the public
utility) is something that is evident in Rousseau’s texts and is acknowledged by every
single author. However the point as to how and on what grounds Rousseau justifies the
General Will causes a split between different authors. While authors like Skhlar and
Arendt argue that compassion and care for other citizens is the basis of Rousseau’s
egalitarianism, authors like Berlin and Canovan argue that reason is the basis of
15
Rousseau’s urge for egalitarianism. In the next section, I will basically mention these two
ways of readings, which form the basis of the two basic readings of Rousseau’s General
Will, namely the romanticist and rationalist readings which I had mentioned at the
Introduction part of my thesis.
1.5. The Romanticist and the Rationalist readings of the General Will
We should admit that Rousseau has both romantic and rationalist inclinations, and both
sides of Rousseau have been influential in the history of ideas. Those who take Rousseau
as a romanticist especially rests upon Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality and Discourse
on Political Economy. Throughout the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau longs for a lost
innocence– the noble savage who was guided purely by instinct and not corrupted by the
materialist and greedy expectations of the society. Rousseau says that uncorrupted savage
man is gone forever and we cannot return to its natural state. Therefore we should rest
upon a social contract whose main concern is equality and concern for others. Judith
Skhlar’s way of reading is such a romanticist reading. She says that, according to
Rousseau, socio-economic equality is the main principle of a society, which is in sharp
contrast with luxury and material self-interest. Skhlar says, this equality is justified on the
basis of a generalized pity for the poor and the weak of the society  (See Skhlar’s article
on Rousseau in Rousseau’s Political Writings) - Relying on this romanticist way of
reading Rousseau, we could say that the ‘will of all’ is taken as something bad by
Rousseau, because it is the aggregation of private wills, which implies egoism, inequality
and envy; whereas the General Will is taken as  good by him, because it is the
compassionate common action towards the common good of the whole society). We
16
should say that this way of reading Rousseau is romanticist in the sense that it refers to
emotions such as “pity” when explaining the grounds of “equality” in Rousseau’s
writings. This way of reading rests on the fact that Rousseau characterizes compassion as
a part of human nature in Discourse on Inequality. He characterizes compassion there as
a natural instinct (See Discourse on Inequality, p. 28).
We should say that Hannah Arendt’s reading of Rousseau’s General Will is also
romanticist. She says, like Skhlar that,  the idea of a General Will rests on a generalized
compassion. She thinks that Rousseau’s General Will is a quest for a strict socio-
economic equality, which assumes that personal benefits are necessarily against the
public utility (Arendt, 1963: 74). Arendt criticizes such a dichotomy, and argues that
private benefits are not necessarily against the public utility. Arendt assumes that
repressing all private interests might cause the reducing multiplicity of society into
singularity (Arendt, 1963: 74). Actually the authoritarian sides of Rousseau’s General
Will is not only mentioned by authors like Arendt who read Rousseau in a romanticist
way, but also by authors like Canovan and Berlin who read him in a rationalist way. We
should not overlook that, unlike in  Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau refers to reason
(moral liberty) in On Social Contract in order to ground his idea of a social contract. This
point is important to differentiate the romanticist and rationalist readings of Rousseau.
 In the rationalist way of reading of Rousseau’s General Will, his insistence on ‘moral
liberty’ which is the control of desires by reason, is taken as the core of Rousseau’s
General Will. We should acknowledge that this rationalist way of reading has been much
17
influential on Kant’s interpretation of Rousseau. Whether Kant did right in reading
Rousseau in a rationalist way is another issue but we should admit that the way he read
Rousseau has been an influential inspiration for many rationalists. Thus, it is important in
terms of the history of ideas to shed light upon the influence of this rationalist reading of
Rousseau.
The fact that Rousseau has been interpreted in a rationalist way by some authors does not
change the reality that the romanticist way of reading was also very important. However I
should say that I confine myself in this dissertation to giving an account of the rationalist
reading of Rousseau by authors like Berlin and Canovan, which I am going to elaborate
through Chapter 2.
Although the rationalist and romantic readings seem to be much different, we could say
that they might be historically reconciled in such a way: Man was born free as a noble
savage (On Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 1, p.85), but society has both corrupted and
denied the possibility of returning to that state of natural liberty. The only way is forward
towards a different kind of liberty, namely moral liberty. If so, the General Will might be
associated with rationalism implicit in Rousseau’s account of moral liberty and not the
romanticism implicit in his account of natural liberty.
In the next chapter, I am going to give the rationalist reading of Rousseau by Canovan
and substantially by Berlin. I am going to argue that Rousseau’s General Will might be
taken as an urge towards the society’s rational self-mastery. In this regard, I am going to
use Berlin’s conception of positive freedom to explain how we could possibly read
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Rousseau’s General Will in a rationalist way. Throughout Chapter 2, I am going to put
Rousseau’s General Will into its epistemological context on the basis of Berlin’s
characterization of monism and pluralism, and criticize Rousseau’s monism for it might
possibly lead to authoritarianism.
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CHAPTER II
BERLIN’S READING OF ROUSSEAU’S GENERAL WILL
AS A RATIONALIST PROJECT
Since the citizens had but one interest,
the people had but one will.
(Rousseau, On Social Contract, p.150)
In this chapter, I am going to argue with reference to Berlin that
Rousseau’s General Will might be read as a rationalist project. This way
of reading rests on the assumption that Rousseau’s conception of ‘moral
liberty’ is an urge towards rational self-government. Following this way of
reading, Rousseau’s insistence on singularity of the General Will might be
read as the compulsion of the citizens to follow their reason in public
affairs. I am going to discuss such a rationalist reading around Berlin’s
conceptualization of negative freedom, positive freedom, monism and
pluralism. In the next section, I start with the unanimity problem, as to
how Rousseau thinks that there should be unanimity in basic political
matters.
2.1. The Unanimity Problem
Let us assume that an assembly is processing a law on the abolishment of
capital punishment. Can we possibly expect that all the parliamentarians
will necessarily converge on the issue and say ‘Yes, Reason necessitates
that capital punishment is sometimes justified’ or ‘No, Reason necessitates
that capital punishment can never be justified'? Could we assume that
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since all parliamentarians share Reason and since they all would like to
take a position that represents the common good of the nation, they will
necessarily end up reaching a unanimous decision? To this question
Rousseau says, ‘Yes’: All the people in the assembly are supposed to
converge on the issue. Because all humans have reason, and as long as
their reason is not corrupted or distracted by ‘private’ concerns they ware
supposed to recognize the common good. Thus, Rousseau views any sign
of dissension from the General Will as a sign of private interest, passion,
or irrationality. He assumes that, as long as the people are not
misinformed, they will always be righteous and will always be in
accordance with the common good.
Rousseau assumes that all individuals should live according to the dictates
of public morality, and not desire or irrational impulses. (Rousseau, 1988:
96). According to Rousseau, making and following one’s own rules is to
be ‘morally free’ (Rousseau, 1988: 96). For him, deviation from the
dictates of public reason is against morality. Thus, he thinks that, if an
individual in the assembly deviates from reason and behaves according to
his private interests rather than the common good, then he should be
forced to be rational and thereby free: “Anyone who refuses to obey the
general will shall be forced to do so by the entire body; which means
nothing else than he will be forced to be free.” (Rousseau, 1988: 95).
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The expression “forced to be free” might sound a bit bizarre to us, but that
Berlin says this is how Rousseau like many other modernists understood
freedom: ‘Only Reason liberates’, or Unreason is unfreedom (Berlin,
1970: 151). With reference to Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction, to be
guided by reason is the rationalistic characterization of positive freedom.
Berlin had defined the search for rational autonomy as the search for
positive freedom. Rational self-mastery, he says, is equated with moral
liberty in the sense that all passions, irrational or whimsical desires are
subordinated to the pure dictates of Reason. The possible  authoritarian
implications of such a disciplining at the individual and the public level
will be mentioned in the coming sections with reference to Berlin and
Canovan. Now, I would like to problematize the relation between moral
liberty and the obligation to unanimity.
           2.2. Moral liberty and the urge for ethico-political convergence
Rousseau assumes that since all individuals share the moral duty to be
rationally in control of their lives, it is also their duty to come to common
terms on basic ethico-political questions. That is why he argued for
unanimity in legislative matters:
Two general rules can serve to regulate these
proportions: the first is that the more important
and serious the decisions, the closer the prevailing
opinion should be to unanimity; the second is that
the more hastily the matter under consideration
must be decided, the smaller the prescribed
majority should be; in decisions that must be
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reached immediately, a majority of a single vote
should suffice. (Rousseau, 1988: 152)
According to Berlin’s reading of Rousseau, Rousseau’s optimism about
how the people in the assembly would arrive at unanimity in legislative
matters, had emanated from his belief in the possibility of a Newtonian
ethics, that the laws of moral life could be discovered by all citizens
adhering to reason alone. We could possibly say that Rousseau shared
such a positivistic belief with other Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, we
should admit that Rousseau's influence on Kant is significant in this
regard:
Newton first saw an order and lawfulness going in
hand with great simplicity, where prior to him
disorder and its troublesome partner, multiplicity,
were encountered, and ever since the comets run in
geometrical paths.
Rousseau first discovered amid the manifold
human forms the deeply hidden nature of man, and
the secret law by which Providence is justified
through his observations. (Immanuel Kant,
Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime [as
an excerpt] in Rousseau’s Political Writings,
p.208).
Thus, Kant saw in Rousseau's work a way to ground politics and ethics in
a fixed moral reality in spite of the apparent diversity of the world we live
in. In the next section, I will further develop the basic assumptions of the
Newtonian Ethics (or Newtonian Body Politics) with reference to
Enlightenment.
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           2.3. Enlightenment and the possibility of a Newtonian Body Politics
The Enlightenment thinkers in the 18th century, among whom Rousseau
was an important figure, being influenced by the accomplishments of the
Newtonian Science, thought that a Newtonian Ethics or a Newtonian Body
Politics could be possible in the world of human beings. Reason was the
standard belief among the intellectuals of that era, by which they thought
all human problems, including the ethical and political ones, could be
solved. In Enlightenment philosophy, the individuals were thought to be
parts of a greater harmonious, moral universe in which their mere role was
thought to be law-abiding (to be rational and moral) subjects without any
dissension. Isaiah Berlin (1970: 154) formulates the basic principles of
such a Newtonian Ethics (which Kant might have partially inherited from
Rousseau) as follows:
first that all men have one true purpose, and one
only, that of ‘rational self-direction’ , second, that the
ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a
single universal, harmonious pattern, which some
men may be able to discern more clearly than others;
third, that all conflict, and consequently tragedy is
due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational or
the insufficient rational—the immature and
undeveloped elements in life—whether individual or
communal, and that such clashes are, in principle,
avoidable, and for wholly rational beings impossible;
finally, that when all men have been made rational,
they will obey the rational laws of their own natures,
which are one and the same in them all, and so be at
once wholly law-abiding and wholly free.
This lucid and technical unfolding of the principles of Newtonian Ethics
by Isaiah Berlin might help to explain why Rousseau was able to argue
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that: “Anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to
do so by the entire body; this means nothing else than that he will be
forced to be free.” (Rousseau, 1988:95).
The content of this famous quotation from Rousseau’s On Social Contract
is actually criticized by some authors to be authoritarian. It is argued that
rationality is figured out  by Rousseau in a monistic way which would
imply that dissidents in a society are to be taken as irrational and therefore
excluded from the decision-making process. This is argued to be  the
tyranny of Rationality within a society. The next sections will be on
Rousseau’s General Will and its monistic and authoritarian implications
according to Berlin and Canovan.
2.4. Rousseau’s General Will and the ‘tyranny of Rationality’
When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people,
what they are being asked is not precisely whether they
approve or reject the proposal, but whether or not it is
consistent with the general will that is their own; each
expresses his own opinion on this point by casting his
vote, and the declaration of the general will is derived
from the counting of the votes. When therefore, the
opinion contrary to my own prevails, this merely proves
that I was mistaken, and that what I considered to be the
general will was not so
(Rousseau, On Social Contract, p.151)
Although Rousseau is known to be a strongly republican democrat, we
should actually elaborate in different ways as to whether Rousseau was
really in favor of democratic deliberation or not. First of all, it would be
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appropriate to give an outline of Rousseau’s rationalistic principles which
lie at the heart of his formulation of democracy and the general will. From
Berlin’s and Canovan’s rationalist reading of Rousseau, the following
principles might be told to lie at the base of Rousseau’s conception of
Rousseau’s General Will:
i. Individuals should direct their individual and public lives only after
Reason (Only by reason can men become morally free).2
ii. Reason is universal: It is God’s voice for all nations (See Rousseau,
1988: 61).3
iii. Since Reason is universal, individual differences are irrelevant in
making rational laws.
ıv. As long as individuals are in accordance with Reason, they will thus be
also in accordance with the General Will.
v. If anyone is somehow against the General Will, it results from the
above principles that he must have been necessarily irrational at some
stage (because otherwise he could in no way be at odds with the purely
rational General Will of the society).
vii. Since we are living in a Rationalist, Harmonious Moral Universe, it
follows that, one who is against the General Will, is to be taken as being at
                                                
2 According to Rousseau, making and following one’s own rules is ‘moral liberty’ (See the editors’ note in
Rousseau’s Political Writings, p.96). Rousseau says that a society should govern itself my making
‘rational’ laws. He assumes that a society, which consists of rational individuals at its base, will be a
rational society at large, which can rationally govern itself. This is how Rousseau links his solitary
‘rational’ individuals to ‘rational’ citizens. Or we could say this is how Rousseau links his rationalist
psychological theory to his rationalist social theory.
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odds with nothing but directly with the Moral Universe, thus he should
necessarily be ‘forced’ to be in harmony with the rationalistic/universal
order, which would mean nothing else than that, he will be forced to be
“free”.4
In the next part, I am going to analyze how Rationality is central to
Rousseau’s conception of democracy.
2.4.1. Rationality and Democracy
My interpretation of Rousseau’s political writings is such that, although
we could read him from a romanticist point of view, as did authors like
Arendt and Skhlar, it is possible that we consistently read him as a
rationalist republican. In accordance with his deductive methodology,
Rousseau takes reason as something ‘out there’ to be discovered. He is
treating reason as if it was the impartial spectator within an assembly, and
reduces reason to a simple tool for a mechanical cross-checking after
arguments:   “...what they are being asked [in the assembly] is not
precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but whether or not it
is consistent with the general will that is their own.” (Rousseau, 1988:
151).
                                                                                                                                                
3  Rousseau (1988:61) had said : “…This is invincible proof that the most general will is also
always the most just, and that the voice of people is indeed the voice of God”. This quotation
clearly implies that Rousseau was a universalist.
4 See (Rousseau, 1988: 96) for ‘moral liberty’.
27
It seems that according to Rousseau, people’s suggestions are asked to be
mechanically compared with what reason (as if it is something out there)
is supposed to dictate to us. From this, it may logically follow however
that “...if the general will is, in fact, a rational deduction of the
implications of a single common interest, then there must be a right
answer, and popular deliberations may not be the best guide to it.”
(Canovan, 1985: 291, italics mine). This is nothing but to acknowledge
that, face-to-face deliberations in an assembly which Rousseau suggests,
would simply be illusory, since ‘reason’ would have already made (or is
supposed to make) people rational copies of each other, and all individual
differences would then be irrelevant and obsolete in influencing the
republican deliberations5: “Finally, where pure logic is concerned, human
plurality is irrelevant” (Canovan, 1985:293).
It seems that Rousseau’s democracy is a 'deductive democracy'.6
According to him, there are rational principles within each and every
individual’s mind, and that, every individual only need  build his
arguments on these a priori principles. It seems that, according to
                                                
5 We should note however that contemporary republican thinkers like Hannah Arendt, respect
individual differences and suggest that, individuals should actively take part in the public
performances to influence the public compromises:  “In opposition to Rousseau’s stress on
rational [logical] interest issuing in a common will, she [Arendt] explores notions of opinion,
judgement, and sheer contingent political compromise that are involved in reaching solutions
appropriate to the plural condition of men” (Canovan,1985: 295).  It also seems that Rousseau’s
conception of General Will totally lacks any possible inter-subjectivity as depicted in Habermas’
conception of ‘deliberative democracy’.
             6 I use this term in a sense which would imply contrariness to  “deliberativeness”.
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Rousseau, discussions would be null and void where they clash with
reason. For example, someone who would say that socio-economic
inequality  might be tolerated, would be taken by Rousseau as irrational,
and he would have, no right to participate into public deliberations with
such an irrational idea. Actually, since judgements about what is rational
(just) and what is irrational (unjust) might be open to arbitrary
manipulation, we could assume that Rousseau’s criterion of reason might
possibly  end up creating an illiberal society which arbitrarily
discriminates between people in terms of those who are rational and those
who are irrational.
Rousseau portrays the General Will with organic metaphors. To him, it is
a single 'Body': A body which should be directed by pure reason, which
necessitates that those parts which dissent from reason should be forced to
be in accordance with reason. This implies that some minorities, marginals
or eccentrics in the society, which might be seen as being whimsical and
thus contrary to reason, can legitimately be forced to be rational (i.e.
forced to be free). We could possibly assume that creating such a
hierarchy of what is rational (prudent) and what is irrational (whimsical)
might lead us to discriminative and authoritarian polities.
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2.5. Berlin’s conception of positive freedom and its relevance with
Rousseau’s General Will
According to Berlin (1970: 131-134), positive freedom aims at self-
legislation (self-mastery). Unlike negative freedom7 which deals with
‘How far the government interferes with you’, positive freedom deals with
‘Who governs you’. To put it another way, positive freedom deals with
whether your real self (rational self) governs you or not. That is to say,
whether your real, rational, higher self governs and takes control of your
lower, passionate, irrational, lower self or not. Positive freedom suggests
that you are positively free to the extent that you purify yourself in terms
of reason, and eliminate passion, emotion or all sorts of irrationality
(Berlin, 1970: 132). In this case, reason (which for Kant is the inner light
in each and every individual) is the real and true part of the self, whereas
the empirical (heteronomous) self is the lower part of the self and that this
lower part of the self should be submitted to the reasoning self by
disciplining and suppressing all irrational impulses and passions. (As
might it be Reason, it is also possible that a certain State, Class or Nation,
says Berlin might be regarded as a more real and true subject of attributes
                                                
7
 Berlin says ‘negative’ freedom is being free from any interference in one’s activities.
Berlin takes the term as did Locke, Hobbes, Mill or Constant. Berlin favors negative
freedom over what he calls as positive freedom. Although I am going to take Berlin’s
conception of negative freedom as a tool to criticize Rousseau; in Chapter 2, I am going
to argue, with reference to Kenny and Rorty that, this term is not neutral in any sense, and
is in fact an ideological defense of liberalism which is in fact merely a historical
contingency.
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than the empirical self, which might possibly lead to authoritarian
consequences.
Berlin says that the metaphysics of positive freedom mostly works as the
denial of the ordinary experience. It always makes an artificial distinction
between the “seen” (surface level) and the “unseen” (deeper levels of
reality).8 Those who are better able to see the deeper levels of reality
(those who can rise above false conscious) are supposed to have the right
to rule the ignorant ones (those who are entrapped in false consciousness).
These ignorant people are seen by the knowing ones as the “material” to
be molded in the course of history. Berlin (1970: 150-151), with reference
to this issue, makes the supposed proponent of positive freedom talk in
such a way, reflecting him as an artist molding his material:
I may conceive myself as an inspired artist, who
mould men into patterns in the light of his unique
vision, as painters combine colors or composers
sounds; humanity is the raw material upon which I
impose my creative will; even though men suffer
and die in the process, they are lifted by it to a
height to which they could never have risen without
my coercive-but creative-violation of their lives.
This  is the argument used by every dictator,
inquisitor, and bully who seeks some moral, or even
aesthetic, justification for his conduct. I must do for
                                                
8 We should note here that Marx’s conception of “false-consciousness” presupposes
such a distinction between what is seen but unauthentic and what is not seen but
authentic. As a matter of fact, Berlin says authenticity is reflected as if it is an occult
entity within us: “[all people] are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they
consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity their latest rational
will, or their ‘true’ purpose and that this entity, although it is believed by all that they
overtly feel and do and say, is their ‘real’ self, of which the poor empirical self in space
and time may know nothing or little; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves
to have its wishes taken into account. (Berlin,1970: 133).
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men (or with them) what they cannot do for
themselves, and I cannot ask their permission or
consent, because they are in no condition to know
what is best for them.
Following the metaphor, we could say that the artist-ruler could use all
humanity as his material on his way to create a great Nation, a World
Ideology or an Eternal Truth. Such an inclination within projects of
positive freedom are all to be taken as potentially authoritarian in the sense
that it might possibly destroy people’s differences for the sake of a ‘truer
reality’.
            2.6. The General Will as positive freedom
Rousseau’s General Will might possibly read as a quest towards positive
freedom since it aims to construct a purely rational (or just ) society which
is exempt from all irrational desires and heteronomies. Rousseau’s self-
government theory and his ideas on ‘moral liberty’ might be told to reflect
a positive conception of freedom: “moral liberty [the freedom to make and
follow one’s own rules], which alone makes man truly his own master, for
impulsion by appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has
prescribed for oneself is liberty.” (Rousseau, 1988: 96). According to the
rationalist way of reading Rousseau’s General Will, this quotation reflects
the basis of Rousseau’s rationalist psychological theory which lies at the
heart of Rousseau’s belief in rational citizens, and thus a rational republic.
In this regard with reference to the categories of reason and desire, the
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General Will simply aims to destroy anything it takes as desire and as
irrational.9 It is argued however that, since the limits of what is rational
and what is irrational is open to manipulation, a society’s General Will
might turn out to be the worst enemy of idiosyncrasies in a society and
turn out to be the basis of a totally illiberal society.
             2.7. The General Will as Monism
Rousseau’s General Will might be told to be politically monist. Because it
assumes that for basic political questions there is one and only one answer,
towards which all citizens are supposed to converge, so that they become
genuine and ‘positively’ free citizens. As an example, we could talk of
Rousseau’s taking socio-economic egalitarianism as the only truth in
social policies. He takes this as a moral truth and regards all other
alternatives as morally corrupt. We should admit however that, as Berlin
would argue , socio-economic egalitarianism is only one choice among
many in social policy and it is not the only choice that we could think of.
Rousseau however reduces the possibilities to only one and says, for the
sake of positive freedom, there should be perfect socio-economic
egalitarianism among citizens.
I am going to argue in the next part with reference to Berlin, that the
monist attitude of Rousseau in ethico-political matters has its
                                                
9 Rousseau’s authoritarianism most probably emanates from the fact that Rousseau believes
“reason” and “desire” to be two distinct and opposing faculties, which, Psycho-analysis has
challenged in many respects.
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epistemological roots, and stands in contrast to epistemological pluralism.
In that part, I am going to explain Berlin’s problematization of
epistemological monism and epistemological pluralism with reference to
their political implications, which I am going to bind to Rousseau’s
political monism and insistence on a singular will.
2.8. The epistemological Roots of political Monism and Political
Pluralism according to Berlin
Berlin says that modern epistemological monism has its roots in the
Newtonian view of universe. According to Isaiah Berlin (1970:154), a
Newtonian moral universe has the following pre-suppositions
[paraphrased by me]:
1. The ethical universe has its constant and ever-lasting ‘laws’
 2. One law does not clash with another (Thus a virtue can never
clash with another virtue).10 Because in a harmonious universe, no
laws could ever clash with others; if they ever did, the universe
would perish at once.
 3. All tragedy in moral life, as would follow from the above two
principles, is due to error or miscalculation.
                                                                                                                                                
10  Social Positivism’s ethical theory takes ethical rules, as if they are ‘laws’; like those of the
universe which are studied by physics, chemistry ,etc...
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Such a Newtonian ethical universe assumes that there is one and only one
solution to a single ethical problem (which finds its best expression
actually in Kant’s Categorical Imperative), which would imply that those
who are in opposition to that single rational solution are necessarily
irrational (and thus morally unfree). Berlin (2000:5-6) formulates the
metaphysical heart of Modernity’s rationalist monism as follows:
that to all true questions , there must be one true answer
and one only, all the other answers being false, for
otherwise the questions cannot be genuine questions. There
must exist a path which leads clear thinkers to the correct
answers to these questions, as much in the moral, social and
political worlds as in that of the natural sciences, whether it
is the same method or not; at once all the correct answers to
the deepest moral, social and political questions that
occupy (or should occupy) mankind are put together, the
result will represent the final solution to all the problems of
existence. Of course, we may never attain to these answers:
human beings may be too confused by their emotions, or
too stupid, or too unlucky, to be able to arrive at them; the
answers may be too difficult, the means may be lacking,
the techniques too complicated to discover; but however
this may be, provided the questions are genuine, the
answers must exist. If we do not know, our successors may
know; or perhaps wise men in antiquity knew; and if they
did not, perhaps Adam in paradise knew; or if he did not,
the angels must know; and if even they do not know, God
must know—the answers must be there”
This is a perfect explanation of epistemological monism, the idea that, to
all true questions, there must be one and only one true answer, all the other
answers being false.
Berlin, epistemologically rejects this monism, and say that, in
ethical/political life, a single true question might have more than one
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answers, all being ‘equally true’ (This epistemological stance corresponds
to nothing but value pluralism, that, people might have different and
opposing values, all of which we should respect and not interfere).11
We could actually better substantiate the political implications of
epistemological monism and epistemological pluralism by a concrete
example. Let us assume that a policy-designer in a country is in a situation
to provide people with ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. The question is: Could he
possibly provide both? Before making an inquiry into the supposed
answers of the two opposing policy-designers, one being
epistemologically monist, and the other being epistemologically pluralist,
let us outline the basic presuppositions of epistemological monism and
epistemological pluralism according to Berlin (1970: 119-172).
2.8.1.  Basic Pre-suppositions of Epistemological Monism according to
Berlin
i. All genuine goods are compatible with each other, by virtue of the fact
that we are living in a Newtonian (Kantian) ethical universe, in which all
goods are dictated to us by Universal Reason.
ii. At a certain point where you are supposed to make a concrete ethical
decision, reason alone could tell you the exact rational solution which
                                                
11 This value-pluralism has its best expression in Berlin’s notion of negative freedom
which defends non-interference in individual preferences.
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would include in itself, by virtue of its being rational, all possible goods,
and leaving out all evils that could pertain to your decision.12
iii. Any evil consequence to come out of an ethical decision, should be
taken as a result of the misapplication or non-application of reason
(because, the argument follows, if you had genuinely applied the
Universal Reason, no evil could ever arise out of your ethical decision,
which retrospectively implies that you should turn  to the previous steps
and do your moral duty as your true reason (Universal Reason) would
have dictated to you.
           2.8.2.  Basic Pre-suppositions of Epistemological Pluralism according
to Berlin
i. Genuine goods are not necessarily compatible with each other. Some
genuine goods are diametrically opposed to other genuine goods, and
hence “tragedy” is unavoidable: Applying Universal Reason can never
bring together the diametrically opposed goods under a single choice; thus
a trade-off is unavoidable; it has to be eventually your “free choice” to
choose either this or that option out of many( Berlin, 1970: 161). This
implies: Choose as you like, notwithstanding each and every option’s
immanent shortcomings with regard to the other equally valid options.
This is to admit that, at a certain point, it is not a matter of Reason to
                                                
12 Berlin (1970: 170 ) says trade-off is not due to our incapability of being fully rational, but it is
due to the nature of the ethical life itself, that some rational goods are opposed to other equally
rational goods. This is the ‘tragic’ nature of life itself.
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choose this or that option, but a matter of mere choice, and as a matter of
fact, neither of the options could ever be evil-free or totally good, since
any option you would choose would create its specific merits while
creating its own shortcomings at the same time. So this is nothing but to
admit, according to Berlin, the tragic side of human choices between
incommensurables.13 (Berlin, 1970: 161).
2.8.3. About Tragedy: Could we ever provide both liberty and
equality simultaneously at their best?
Relying on Berlin’s characterization, An ‘epistemologically monist’ policy
designer would assume that, in any country at a certain time within certain
conditions, we could figure out by reason what sorts of policies should be
implemented to provide the citizens both perfect liberty and perfect
equality through a single rational solution.
An ‘epistemologically pluralist’ policy designer however would assume
that liberty and equality are diametrically opposed values, although both
valuable in their own terms, and thus both cannot be provided to their full
                                                                                                                                                
13  To give an example, a student sitting in a class can never be said to have done the rational
thing, since attending the class might secure its own merits, but makes it impossible for one to be
outside with his friends. Rousseau or Kant would say, attending the class is the rational choice and
they would deny the specific evils (or losses) inherent in that ‘rational’ choice. We should admit,
following liberals like Isaiah Berlin, that attending a class is attending a class, and it has its own
advantages and disadvantages; going out with friends is going out with friends, and it has its own
advantages and disadvantages. So to say, there is no ‘the rational answer’ : There are different
answers, different  choices, which can not be ultimately arbitrated by reason, but which is to be
finalized by ‘choices’. Berlin says, whereas Romanticism admits the individual’s idiosyncrasies
and ‘tragic’ life, Rationalism takes ‘reason’ as the ultimate and adequate solver of any problem,
and exerts a single answer to everyone as the rational answer, which is actually monist and
possibly despotic in character.
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extent. Therefore you should either provide people with either more
liberty or more equality.14 There cannot be a rational or moral
argumentation on this problem that can ultimately bind every one of us in
the same universal manner.15
Acknowledging that it is a matter of mere choice, an epistemologically
pluralist person would definitely respect all possible political articulations
having different sorts of emphasis with regard to the question ‘How much
liberty, how much equality?’ Whereas an epistemologically monist would
simply not respect different moral reasonings on this issue, since only
‘one’ of these reasonings is the true answer to the question at hand, others
being all wrong, irrational and immoral.
So we should conclude that epistemological pluralism, that, one question
can have not only one rational answer but many, gives way to political
                                                
14  Berlin says liberty and equality are diametrically opposed values, therefore tragedy is
unavoidable. Unlike Rationalists who say there is a rational point which satisfies both, Berlin says
taking more of one decreases your chance to take more of the other; so you should either take
more liberty or more equality at a certain point; both are not possible (Berlin, 1970:161). Berlin
here implies that there is no Universal Reason to solve this tragedy. According to him, there are
different “choices”, all of which are tragic, yet with different priorities, which we should all
respect. Out of this projection of Berlin, it would result that Rousseau’s General Will denies
tragedy and plural choices, since it assumes that there is always a single rational solution for a
political question. Rousseau’s General Will is monistic in the sense that it does not even figure out
a choice problem between socio-economic egalitarianism and more competitiveness on their
merits and weaknesses, but simply takes egalitarianism as the rational solution.
15  which is to say there is no Universal Reason to solve our social problems. Every one has his/her
own way of reasoning, which necessarily requires that a society should provide its citizens an
atmosphere of ‘political plurality’ in which different moral reasonings can all exist along with
each other.
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pluralism which takes different policy options as equally respectable.
However epistemological monism, that, one question can have one and
only one rational answer, gives way to political monism which takes only
one possible form of political reasoning as acceptable and takes the others
as heretical or unfree and therefore labels them as needing to be ‘forced to
be free’, which is an expression of authoritarianism..
In the next section, I am going to criticize Rousseau’s General Will
according to the pre-suppositions of political pluralism.
             2.9. Rousseau’s General Will in the light of Political Pluralism
Political Pluralism assumes that individuals all have their own choices in
life and these choices are incommensurable. We could say that Berlin’s
conception of negative freedom which is the result of his value-pluralism
have the following implications:
i. Individuals have no metaphysical essence, any human nature, or reason,
out of which we could possibly derive what a human being had to need, do
or refrain from. Therefore each individual should be left out with his/her
own life project without being hindered by others on the basis of any
assumed reason or common good16 (Please see the negative freedom part
in Berlin, 1970: 122-131).
                                                
16  A ‘common good’ is always assumed by  political thinkers  on the assumption that people have
a ‘common’ human nature
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 ii. Universal definitions of reason or truth are problematic in terms of
negative freedom in the sense that they imply depravity or irrationality for
those who do not fit the existing criteria of truth or rationality. Therefore
claims to universal validity should be dismissed, on the basis that the
negative liberties of some people might be violated in the name of others’
projects of universal truth or universal rationality. This procedurally
implies that, negative liberties should be prior to concerns about whether
individuals are positively free or not.17
I believe that these two items above that came out of Berlin’s conception
of negative freedom can be put in terms of the distinction between the
‘private’ and the ‘public’ as such:
 i. Individual ethos is private and therefore inviolable.
ii. An individual is to be taken as an inappropriate unit to become part of a
publicly-defined ethos or a publicly-defined General Will,18 since an
individual shares no metaphysical essence or any common political
teleology with others. Therefore, if ever one is made part of such a
totalizing public body, it is possible that some of his negative liberties
                                                
17 In a liberal state, no supreme authority should assume a job for itself to supervise whether
people are “philosophically” free or not. A liberal state is assumed to provide its citizens only
‘negative liberties’ (such as freedom of property, freedom of speech, freedom of communication,
etc..). According to the ‘negative’ notion of freedom, which is the conventional liberal
understanding of freedom, the individuals should be perfectly free to the extent that they do not
harm others.
18 The Newtonian Ethics assumes that individual ethos and public ethos can be merged into a
single ethical project, since all individuals will obey the same rational laws and no clash between
these laws will ever arise. According to Berlin, Rousseau’s General Will is such a belief in the
Newtonian Body Politics, where citizens are parts of a harmonious, rational public universe.
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might be violated for the sake of the so-called common good. Yet
ironically enough, Berlin says, he or she could be told by the society that
s/he is forced to nothing but to his/her own freedom.
Berlin assumes, through his notion of negative freedom, that individuals have no
human nature or essence that is true for everyone, and thus despises all projects of
positive freedom like that of Rousseau’s General Will. However it is stated by
some authors that Berlin’s negative freedom itself implies a human nature and a
claim to objectivity. In the next chapter, I am going to give an account of the
challenges towards Berlin’s critic of Rousseau, and reflect upon whether we have
any objective criteria to choose between either monism or pluralism.
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CHAPTER III
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS UPON BERLIN AND HIS
CRITIC OF ROUSSEAU: MONISM VERSUS
PLURALISM
Berlin, like other liberals, thinks that negative freedom is only procedural
and says nothing about how individuals should actually live. However
negative freedom also has its own genealogy, some authors say, and could
be traced back to its historical pre-suppositions about what is the good
form of life for people. In the following sections, I will explore the
implications of Michael Kenny and Richard Rorty’s  criticisms on Berlin.
3.1. Kenny’s critic of Berlin
 Kenny (2000: 1032) says that Berlin’s conception of man as reflected in
the negative notion of freedom is a paradigmatic continuation of Fichte’s
‘active, dynamic, imaginative self’’. He says, Berlin’s affirmation of the
romantic ideal is not neutral in any sense. Rather, we should say that
Berlin's ideal is an alternative to the rationalistic model of Enlightenment;
and being so, it has its own presuppositions about the human nature, that
men are freely choosing agents and thus value creators, and therefore
should be free in their personal choices (i.e. negative freedom). It is true
that the idea of tragic choice is reflected in Berlin’s writings as if it is a
universal feature of all men in the world for all times. However we should
admit that viewing individuals as such is historically contingent, and
expecting that all human projects be bound on such a presupposition is
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itself historical, ideological and has its own ‘positive’ counterpart (Kenny,
2000: 1031).
Kenny says that Berlin’s position is a committed liberalism. He says this
commitment is influenced from the Cold War period and its polarizations :
“negative against positive liberty above all, as the normative
internalization of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ logic animating the Cold War”
(Kenny, 2000: 1037). In this regard, Berlin’s characterization of positive
freedom and its possible authoritarian results might be thought to be
influenced from Berlin’s overt liberal commitments during the ideological
polarizations of the Cold War. Berlin’s characterization of negative
freedom and pluralism as the good form of life is criticized by different
authors, on the basis that Berlin takes his liberal commitments as the
‘truth’, and accordingly the non-liberal and illiberal ones as something
being against the ‘truth’ of liberalism (In this regard, Berlin’s critic of
Rousseau in a very negative tone for being a non-liberal or an illiberal is to
be thought within this objectivist claim to the ‘truth’ of liberalism).
Richard Rorty who defines himself as a pragmatist liberal, actually
challenges criticizes Berlin’s and other modernist liberals’ claim to the
‘truth’ of the liberal project, and says that liberalism itself is only a
historical contingency and should be understood within this historicity. In
order to be able to have a critical understanding of Berlin and his critic of
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Rousseau, I believe that Rorty’s ideas on the contingency of liberalism
might be very illuminating.
3.2. Rorty as an  ‘ironist liberal’ and his critic of modernist liberals
like Berlin
Rorty as a liberal thinker makes himself distinct from many other liberal
thinkers through his anti-foundationalism. He says that all knowledge is
true to the extent that it is part of a certain ‘language game’.19 This
postmodernist attitude makes him criticize all meta-narratives, liberal and
illiberal. As a matter of fact, he severs himself from the modernist liberals
by calling them 'metaphysical liberals’ and calls himself an ‘ironist liberal’
(See Rorty, 1989:91).
Rorty’s anti-foundationalist methodology provides us with a useful basis
to further illuminate of the concepts of the general will, monism,
pluralism, negative freedom, positive freedom and contingency. In Rorty’s
view all concepts are historical constructs and therefore should be
understood with reference to their specific metaphors (Rorty, 1989: 23-
44). This is in fact a very relativist understanding of history, which is
much different from either Rousseau or Berlin whom I am making
subjects of my inquiry in this study.
                                                
19 Rorty is of course influenced from Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Derrida in this regard.
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Rorty himself explains his own liberalism not by the ‘truth’ of liberalism
but with reference to his liberal upbringing and the practical benefits and
superiority of liberalism over other systems. So overall, Rorty admits that
liberalism, too, is only a ‘language game’ and we should cling to it only
for pragmatic concerns.
Rorty’s approach to political thinkers is always relativist. Rorty does not
directly refer to Rousseau, but he could possibly say, for example, that
Rousseau’s political ideas are discernable only within a ‘Newtonian’
language game, and as long as that language game is in usage, his ideas
would stay being fashionable. Or with regard to Berlin, Rorty would say,
inferring from what he says about modernist liberals, that Berlin’s
liberalism is discernable only within a language game that takes negative
freedom as the superior value.
Rorty being aware of such contingencies, totally rejects the universality or
objectivity of liberalism and attaches to it only a limited, historical and
contextual meaning, yet has a commitment to it for merely, he says,
institutionalist and practical benefits that other alternative systems might
not provide us. Many people find Rorty’s defense of liberalism quite a
weak one, since he doesn’t refer to the objective superiority of liberalism
over illiberal projects or of pluralism over monism. However Rorty argues
that quest for such ‘objective’ justifications, are reminiscent of
metaphysical habits, and post-metaphysical people, Rorty says, do not
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need any metaphysical justification for continuing liberal institutions, and
that they can rely on merely pragmatist and solidaristic concerns (Rorty,
1989: 87). In the next section, I am going to give an account of Rorty’s
conception of contingency and irony which lie at the heart of his ironist
liberalism.
Rorty, as an anti-foundationalist thinker, rejects all a priori universals,
such as reason, truth, morality, or human nature, and instead suggests a
non-metaphysical and non-essentialist re-definition of liberalism, by virtue
of which all identities (individual or social) could be seen as mere
contingencies and therefore continuously criticized, redefined and
experimented upon.
Rorty says all our individual lives and communities are products of time
and space, which is to say that, they are not products of a historical or
metaphysical necessity, but are merely “historical contingencies”. To view
them all in their contingency makes one an ironist, Rorty says.
Rorty (1989: 73) says he shall define an ironist as someone who fulfills
three   conditions:
i. She has radical and has continuing doubts about the
final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has
been impressed by other vocabularies.
ii. She realizes that argument phrased in her vocabulary
can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts.
iii. In so far as she philosophizes about her situation, she
does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality
47
than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.
Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see the choice
between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral
and universal meta-vocabulary nor by an attempt to fight
one’s way post appearances to the real, but simply by
playing the new off against the old.
Rorty is actually here defining ironist as someone being relativist, who is
aware that every thing is possible by re-definition:
I call people of this sort ironist because their realization
that anything can be made to look good or bad being
re-described, and their renunciation of the attempt to
formulate criteria of choice between final vocabularies
puts them in the position which Sartre called “meta-
stable”: never quite able to take themselves seriously
because always aware that the terms in which they
describe themselves are subject to change, always
aware of the contingency and fragility of their final
vocabularies and thus of their selves.
3.3. The Contingency of Liberalism
Unlike Berlin who took liberalism and value-pluralism as a universal and
supra-historical truth, Rorty admitted that liberalism is only a historical
and contingent reality and that we should not approach it as a supra-
historical narrative. In the ‘The Contingency of Community’ part of
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty explains this as such:
I should like to replace both religious and
philosophical accounts of supra-historical ground or
an end of history convergence with a historical
narrative about the rise of liberal institutions and
customs- the institutions and customs which were
designed to diminish cruelty, make possible
government by the consent of the governed, and
permit as much domination-free communication as
possible to take place. Such a narrative would clarify
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the conditions in which the idea of truth as
correspondence to reality might gradually be
replaced by the idea of truth as what comes to be
believed in the course of free and open encounters
(Rorty, 1991: 68).
Rorty actually differentiates himself from all people who he calls as
objectivists. He says objectivists are people who believe that they can
explain things, Newtonian-style, with reference to the true nature of
things. They take truth as independent of humans and as a something we
seek to 'correspond to' in our human. (Rorty, 1991: 21-22). He says we are
heirs of such an objectivist tradition
which centers around the assumption that we must
step outside our community long enough to
examine it in the light of something which
transcends it, namely, that which it has in common
with every other actual and possible human
community. This tradition dreams of an ultimate
community which(...) will exhibit a solidarity which
is not parochial because it is the expression of an
ahistorical human nature. Much of the rhetoric of
contemporary intellectual life takes for granted that
the goal of scientific inquiry into man is to
understand “underlying structures” or culturally
invariant factors or biologically determined patterns
(Rorty, 1991: 22). 20
 Being antithetical to this objectivist tradition, Rorty defines himself as
“solidarist”, which implies that he does not look for any non-human,
objective truth or correspondence to this universal truth in justifying
                                                
20  Remember Kant’s words about Rousseau in the light of this reference to objectivism:
“Rousseau first discovered amid the manifold human forms the deeply hidden nature of
man, and the secret law by which Providence is justified through his observations”. (in
Rousseau’s Political Writings, p.208).
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actions, but finds it sufficient to be a member of a ‘linguistic community’
and produce solutions to problems on a pragmatist basis without reference
to any objective truth. Therefore Rorty differentiates himself from what he
calls the metaphysical liberals because he views them as objectivists.
Rorty as a solidarist (or pragmatist) does not look for any objective reality
justification for being a liberal such as reason or human nature. He says he
is a liberal for merely solidaristic and pragmatist concerns.
In this regard, we should say that Rorty’s critique applies to Berlin and his
objectivist reading of pluralism, that pluralism is a truth, or that the world
is in reality a plural one. Rorty rejects such epistemological claims about
what the world’s true essence is.
Taking Rorty seriously, it would follow from the argument that Berlin’s
critic of Rousseau as being monist is only another appeal to objectivity,
and it is only a shifting from a ‘monist’ language game to a ‘pluralist’
language game. All that Berlin is doing is criticizing Rousseau for picking
out the wrong understanding of reality. The question is how does Berlin
know that he has picked out or represented the true understanding of
reality? Indeed how does he know there is some objective reality to be
represented in the first place? Therefore Rorty says, he himself drops all
claims to moral or epistemological realism and only deals with
“pragmatist” questions in order to better the liberal institutions.
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We do not need to accept Rorty’s anti-foundationalism or his ‘ironist
liberalism’, but his ideas are provocative in the sense that we could view
the ideas of either Rousseau or  Berlin from a very different angle when
we apply his critique of claims to objectivity. Within the general aim of
this thesis, we could say that Rousseau’s ideas on contingency and irony
might give us a better understanding of both Rousseau and Berlin. Since
Rousseau’s conception of a singular General Will or Berlin’s conception
of pluralism, might both be called within Rorty’s paradigm, as two
historical constructs, one being monist, the other being pluralist, among
which we actually cannot choose without referring to some objectivity.
Rorty as a pragmatist liberal is a subtle thinker and has his own political
commitments. However, here I do not aim to give his own understanding
of politics since I just aim here to mention him as a critical liberal thinker
who might give us a sense of the contingency of monism or pluralism
(Rorty’s own position, namely to criticize all objectivist and
foundationalist claims as something negative and to replace them with a
pragmatist attitude, might also be criticized in some respects as being
foundationalist, but here I do not aim to do this critique since it is
irrelevant with the general aim of this thesis. However I should briefly
state that, it is almost impossible to be purely anti-foundationalist and
avoid all sorts of claims to objectivity). In the next section, I am going to
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give a general account of monism and pluralism and ask whether we could
appeal to either monism or pluralism without any claims to objectivity. I
would basically claim that monism (as Rousseau had suggested through a
singular General Will) or pluralism (as Berlin had suggested through his
liberalism) are two different paradigms, which rely on different political
pre-suppositions. In the Conclusion part of my thesis, I will conclude that
projects of singularity or plurality are two different historical realities and
therefore should be viewed within their very historicity. In the next
section, I will ask the question whether we could choose monism or
pluralism without any appeal to objectivism.
3.4. Is There a way to choose between monism or pluralism without
any appeal to objectivity
It could be argued that pluralism is better than monism because a pluralist
society might turn out to be a monist society more easily than a monist
society could turn out to be a plural one. Yet, this would be simply
because a pluralist political system, would supposedly be more open and
would allow for changes more easily than a monist, closed and repressive
society. However we should say thatthis relative ease has nothing to do
with the internal value of either monism or pluralism, but is an argument
on the likelihood of possible transition from one system to the other.
Although we could assume that the likelihood of transition from pluralism
to monism by virtue of the public discussions is more likely than the vice
versa, still however, one cannot justify why pluralism is a good thing
52
without presupposing that the easiness of a system to change as it wishes
without any external impediments is a good thing. This is to say that,
taking pluralism as better than monism just because it allows possible
shifts by virtue of the possibility of public discussions which might not
exist in a monist system, relies on the presupposition that free discussions
without any external hindrances (i.e. negative freedom) is a good thing.
There is no problem with such a liberal pre-supposition, but we should
admit that it somehow relies on the inherent goodness of free discussion
which is mostly envisaged by liberals as one of the important negative
liberties of a society. So following a liberal position like J.S. Mill or Isaiah
Berlin, one could safely say that pluralism is superior than singularity.
However, we should say that, it would be against open-mindedness to
argue that pluralism is a supra-historical reality or is a ‘truth’. There could
be many independent arguments on why discussion, negative freedom and
pluralism are superior values than singularity, but we should admit that
without relying on some sort of a foundationalism (such as the ultimate
value of free discussion) it is impossible to say that a pluralist (or liberal)
society with many particular wills (‘will of all’) is better than a singular
General Will. Because we should admit that pluralism and monism have
divergent pre-suppositions. Pluralism relies on  the pre-supposed goodness
of negative freedom and social diversity, while singularism relies on the
pre-supposed goodness of the convergence towards the singular ethical
life of the society (i.e. positive freedom).
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Since the aim of this dissertation is not to give a polemical defense of
pluralism against singular world views, I simply have not aimed in my
thesis to speculate on why supporting free discussions and diversity in a
society could be better in terms of argument than restricting possible
interactions among social groups, because I believe that this would be the
subject of another thesis. Here, I have confined myself rather to show that
Rousseau’s political stance as reflected through his conception of a
singular General Will, is much different than the positions of liberals like
J.S. Mill or Berlin who are in favor of allowing different views in a society
to unfold themselves freely and without any hindrances. I believe that one
should view both views in their own historicity, and not forget that both
views rely on very different social and political pre-suppositions and very
different political practices.
3.5. Are we left without a basis for criticizing Rousseau's General Will
and its legacy?
If we return back to the starting point of this thesis, we are now left with
the following problem: The upshot of our critique of those who seek to
ground pluralism or monism in objectivity, is that we seem to be left with
no basis upon which to choose between those two alternatives. An anti-
objectivist or anti-foundationalist position seems to entail that organizing
law and society around a will common all is just as defensible as basing
law and society on the multiplicity of often incompatible particular wills.
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We should say that monism and pluralism are two irreconcilable
approaches. Political monism assumes that ultimate source of political
justification is singular, while political pluralism assumes that ultimate
source of political justification are many. Both are different beliefs and
positions about the world and they are mutually exclusive. One cannot
turn out to be monist without giving up pluralism, and similarly one
cannot turn out to be monist without giving up pluralism. Which do we
choose?
Given this problem, is there a way to criticize the legacy of Rousseau's
General Will? One avenue is to argue that pluralism is comparatively
better than monism because it leaves open the possibility of converging on
monism, while monism precludes the possibility of arriving at pluralism.
Here I mean possible in its strict logical sense. That is not to say that
pluralism is a guaranteed procedure for unraveling whether monism or
pluralism is objectively true. The argument simply claims that it is
possible. Indeed the argument does not hinge on the presupposition that
there is objective truth to be discovered. Rather it says that, if it turns out
that there is an objective reality, pluralism does not preclude us knowing
it, while monism does preclude us from knowing it. In other words, the
paradigm in which a monistic world is confined bars us from being aware
of any alternatives. We are trapped within its singular world-view.
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From this point of view we can criticize Rousseau's general will tradition,
not because it is contrary to what is claimed to be true reality by authors
like Berlin (namely, objective pluralism), but because it closes the door on
questioning itself. It is entirely self-contained (i.e. self-referential) and
therefore beyond self-assessment. It excludes the possibility of it knowing
that it may be wrong or from confirming (after serious criticism) that it has
yet to be disproved. (Note that this is similar to J. S. Mill's defense of
pluralism- See his On Liberty, chapter 2 -  However, Mill implies that
pluralism is a reliable discovery method, whereas I am simply arguing that
it leaves open the possibility of discovery). In a world guided by the
dictates of the will common and instilled in all, alternatives (whether
critical or not) are beyond its frame of reference. Thus the possibility of
recognizing pluralism, should it turn out to be objectively true, is blocked.
By contrast pluralism leaves open a possible basis for becoming aware of
monism, should it turn out to be objectively true. Here pluralism is
defended purely because of its instrumental value (i.e. because it provides
for the possibility of discovery) rather than (as Berlin argues) its intrinsic
value.
We should be careful, however, for it may be pointed out that there is a
form of objectivism at work here. Namely the argument presupposes that
leaving open the possibility of discovery is something that we should
value (and that because the General Will forecloses the possibility of
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discovery it should therefore be rejected as a way to organize law and
government). While fully acknowledging that challenge, however, we
should also acknowledge that this is a decidedly thin and uncontroversial
appeal to objectivity. By thin, I mean that the argument by no means
presupposes a precise and detailed understanding of what the good life is
in all cases (i.e. the possibility of discovery is valued but what is to be
discovered is left open). Secondly, by uncontroversial I mean that, upon
careful reflection informed people would be inclined to accept the
argument as entirely reasonable. Thus we may suggest, in conclusion, that
if the reader accepts this line of argument, then the Rousseauian legacy
can indeed be challenged on the grounds that it denies any room for self-
criticism and therefore reform.
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